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INSANITY AS A DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL LAW
S. OLEY CUTLER, S.J.*
A THE PRESENT TIME it is estimated that there are some 17,000,000
Americans (one in ten) suffering from mental or emotional disorders.
There are over 750,000 patients in mental hospitals (as many as are
in all other hospitals combined), with a current admission rate of
300,000 new patients each year. The magnitude of mental illness in
our nation, America's number one health problem, is indeed alarming.
The present low state of mental health in the United States, therefore,
points up vividly the urgent necessity for a careful yet thorough study
of this major problem and its total impact on the law - for the area of
mental disability law has recently been described as "a new legal frontier.'
With the close of World War I there has also been a comparable
growth in crime and other forms of lawlessness in the United States.
While not many who comprise the vast number of the mentally ill ever
become involved with the criminal law, the impact of one upon the
other has been often deemed worthy of consideration. The result has
been numerous, often voluminous studies in the very area where
mental illness and the criminal law must often meet: when insanity is
raised as a defense to responsibility for criminal activity. Almost all
of these studies, at one stage or another, come unavoidably around to
a discussion of fundamentals: of crime, punishment, the elements of
human behavior, the question of why man so acts towards his fellow
man and towards the society that has protected and prospered him.
* A.B. (1946), M.A. (1948), Boston College; LL.B. (1952), Georgetown Univer-
sity. Member of Governor Harriman's Conference on the Defense of Insanity.
1 Kittrie, Mental Disability Law, 3 STUDENT LAW. J. 5 (June 1958).
INSANITY Af A DEFENSE
Any discussion of "tests" of insanity in
the law or of insanity as a legal concept
must of necessity, therefore, discuss to some
extent the fundamental notions both of
crime and of mental illness. What has
been objectional in too many of such dis-
cussions is the tendency to equate the two.
Thus,
It is my personal opinion . . . that no
person in our society is in a normal state
of mind when he commits a murder. I
believe this holds even when monetary gain
appears to be the sole motive for the
offense.
My criticism of this and similar articles
[i.e., a note on the M'Naghten Rule] centers
on the assumption that the basic philosophy
is correct. This concept is based on the
concept of "free will," that man is free to
exercise his will for good and evil.2
Or again: "Man's variegated character and
wide capacities have blinded us to the fact
that he is in fact as passive to his creation
and development, and hence as unaccount-
able for his actions as an inanimate ma-
chine." 3
Dr. Guttmacher and Professor Weihofen
in their book Psychiatry and the Law quote
with approval the remark of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
We must agree with Justice Frankfurter
when he writes, "We can no longer rest
content with the adequacy of the concep-
tion of criminal intent as an expression of
full and free choice between doing a pre-
scribed act or not doing it." But translating
this into the concept that all malefactors
are mentally sick people is a reductio ad
absurdum.4
2 Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic Psy-
chiatry, 45 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 123, 130-31
(1954).
3 Fearey, Concept of Responsibility, 45 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P. S. 21, 24 (1954).
4 GUTTMACHER & WEMOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 25-26 (1952).
I feel certain, however, that the loftiness
of purpose that pervades many of these
discussions on the difficult subject of re-
sponsibility is more indicative of the au-
thors' true sentiments than are these
sporadic confoundings of the power of
free will with its occasional diminished
capacity. Nonetheless, those who write so
assuredly of the philosophy of freedom and
its perennial relationship to criminal juris-
prudence should not fail to acquaint them-
selves with the real teaching of the great
scholastic philosophers who fathered the
philosophy of that jurisprudence.5
It is significant, I think, that the Durham
rule, which has so often been attacked for
its implied denial of free will, should have
been the occasion for the appearance of an
article, written by a distinguished phy-
chiatrist, entitled Criminality and Mental
Illness - Two Faces of the Same Coin.6
The symposium on Durham, which carried
this article, was noteworthy in that it
brought to the forefront of discussion many
of the really basic issues involved in the
question of insanity as a defense in crim-
inal cases. It is basic considerations of this
nature that I will discuss in this article.
Insanity - a Legal Concept
It is said in defense of Durham's "prod-
uct" test that it enables law to catch up
with the advances made in medical science,
especially in that of psychiatry. This argu-
ment, it appears to me, is based upon an
erroneous approach to the entire problem.
It was first stated in the famous New
Hampshire Pike7 decision:
5 Cf. FORD & KELLY, 1 CONTEMP. MORAL THEOL-
ooY 221 n.16 (1958).
6 Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness - Two
Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 320
(1955).
7 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
It was for a long time supposed that
men, however insane, if they knew an act
to be wrong, could refrain from doing it.
But whether this supposition is correct or
not, is a pure question of fact. The sup-
position is a supposition of fact, - in other
words, a medical supposition, - in other
words a medical theory . .. The knowl-
edge test in all its forms, and the delusion
test, are medical theories, introduced in
immature stages of science, in the dim
light of earlier times, and subsequently,
upon more extensive observations and more
clinical examination, repudiated by the
medical profession. But legal tribunals have
claimed those tests are immutable principles
of law, and have fancied they were abun-
dantly vindicated by a sweeping denuncia-
tion of medical theories.8
These "insanity tests," if held as valid
medical tests of an immutable character by
the older courts, were as misleading then
as is the reasoning of Mr. Justice Doe, just
quoted. These "tests" in themselves are not
tests of mental illness, based upon medical
theories. If they ever were, they were justly
repudiated by an enlightened medical pro-
fession. But as they are used in the law, as
symptoms, as clinical evidence of mental
disease, they are never so purported to be
and I seriously doubt if any court ever held
that they were. It is not the law's purpose or
special competence to determine mental
illness. Rather, its job is to measure irre-
sponsibility in its relationship to legally
prohibited conduct and to do so, in the case
8 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 403, 437 (1869). "The
opinions in State v. Pike are to be found in 49
New Hampshire Reports, pp. 399, 403. There is
a reporter's note at p. 399 stating: 'This case was
decided in June Term, 1869, and should have ap-
peared in 48 N.H. It was examined and reaffirmed
in State v. Jones [50 N.H. 369 (1871) ], Rocking-
ham June Term, 1871.' The decision in State v.
Pike is erroneously shown as having been decided
in June 1870." BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 221
n.66 (1955).
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of the two above-mentioned knowledge
and delusion tests, by the use of criteria
most descriptive, as well as most determin-
ative, of an individual's capacity to enter-
tain a criminal intent as well as to commit
the illegal act.
To state that these indicia of irrespon-
sibility are merely facts (and indeed, medi-
cal facts), as was done in Pike and on
countless occasions since, is seriously to
obfuscate the entire issue and to solve
none of its problems. This is precisely the
point which, in a recent case,9 the Supreme
Court of Nevada singled out for especial
criticism in the Pike approach: "Under this
decision insanity was not defined as a
matter of law, but in effect was made a
question of fact to be determined by the
jury as any other fact would be deter-
mined.""0
What is a question of fact, what of law,
are unavoidably inter-related in this prob-
lem. The point that must always be insisted
upon is that insanity is a legal concept. As
such, the court must define and explain it
by necessary criteria to a jury and not
leave it up to their good common sense and
moral instinct, without any proper guid-
ance. The guides or criteria of "knowledge,"
etc., may be poor, inadequate ones in the
light of presently available knowledge from
the medical sciences. However, the basic
line of approach to the problem of irrespon-
sibility taken by the M'Naugten rule, for
example, is legally sound. As Professor
Weschler said:
The attacks on M'Naghten rule as an
inept definition of insanity or as an
arbitrary definition in terms of special
symptoms are entirely misconceived. The
rationale of the position is that there are
9 Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1957).
1o ld. at 918.
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cases in which reason cannot operate and
in which it is totally impossible for in-
dividuals to be deterred. 1
Insanity - Towards a Definition
If insanity, then, is a legal concept, what
is its definition, what is its importance to
the criminal law, and its relevance, even,
in the light of modern scientific progress?
Not all lawyers and jurists, not to mention
psychiatrists, are happy with the term
"insanity." Judge Biggs, for example, says
that ". . . the divergence between law and
psychiatry is caused in part by a legal
fiction, represented by the words 'insanity'
or 'insane,' which are a kind of lawyers'
catch-all and have no clinical meaning.' 1
2
Because of its importance to the right
understanding of the requirements for and
defenses to crime, insanity as a legal con-
cept is very essential to the law. This
concept is admittedly a difficult one to
understand, and yet, despite the difficulty,
a definition must be attempted. As the
judge in Sollars v. State,13 declared:
A definition is necessary. "Insanity" and
"sound mind" are terms used by statute....
The court, then must continue to recognize
the statutory concept of "insanity" as the
basis of relief from criminal responsibility.
The term must be given meaning and
significance if a jury is to be able to find
such a condition to exist.'
4
This same case, too, has answered its
own difficulty as well as any court could:
"In criminal law 'insanity', by whatever test
it may be ascertained, may be said to be
that degree or quantity of mental disorder
which relieves one of the criminal respon-
11 ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.01, at 156, Com-
ment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
12 BIGGs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 117.
13 Sollars v. State, supra note 9.
14 Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d. 917 (Nev. 1957).
sibility for his actions."' 5
It is the lack of even this degree of pre-
cision, indeed of any definition at all,
which is so fatally ambiguous in Durham,
as we shall see. Any test that lacks criteria
to aid a jury in arriving at its factual de-
termination of the defendant's irresponsi-
bility, and which fails to define what
amounts to irresponsibility, fails as a test.
While admitting, for example, that grada-
tions of mental illness do exist,' 6 neverthe-
less, the Durham court expects the jury to
decide for itself, without further guidance,
in the same fashion as juries do with respect
to expert testimony in a damage suit:
In such cases, the jury is not required
to depend on arbitrarily selected "symp-
toms, phases or manifestations" of the
disease as criteria for determining the ul-
timate question of fact upon which the
claim depends. Similarly, upon a claim of
criminal irresponsibility, the jury will not
be required to rely upon such symptoms,
as criteria for determining the ultimate
question of fact upon which such claim
depends.'7
The tort example which the court here
uses is one of total disability under an
insurance policy. The choice of the com-
parison is manifestly unfortunate. In the
first place, damage awards, as all know so
well, are too frequently the results of preju-
dice, ignorance, and whim - a situation
which should not lightly be introduced into
the field of criminal law.
Insanity Tests
What then of the various tests for deter-
mining criminal irresponsibility when in-
sanity is raised as a defense in criminal
15 Ibid.
16 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
17 Id. at 875.
proceedings - what of these tests presently
in use and their proposed alternatives? The
articles in this symposium have fulsomely
treated both the traditional tests, as well
as the Durham substitute now in use in
the District of Columbia. In turn, this
article has shown why some sort of criteria
as a guidance to the jury must be had. At
the same time the query often arises, "Why
any reform of the traditional M'Naghten
rule at all?" The chief argument for change
with which there is now fairly general agree-
ment is that there is need for some sort of
enlightened reform in this area. After all,
in enlightening the jury as to the criteria,
whatever they be, that they are to use in
arriving at their factual determination of
responsibility, expert testimony at trial must
be used. Much progress has been achieved
up to the present time in the quality of that
testimony, based on medical advances
through the years, which cannot but be
recognized. By the same token, there is
likewise by this time, fairly general dis-
satisfaction with the results attempted by
Durham, as well as with the rule of that
case in se. The reaction of the federal
judiciary, and those state courts which
have considered it, are fairly indicative of
this feeling of disappointment and dissat-
isfaction.
The Fifth Circuit in Howard v. United
States' s8 rejected the "product" test. Here a
conviction of robbery with use of a danger-
ous weapon was affirmed despite the in-
sanity plea, with Judge Rives dissenting.
The latter was very critical of the M'Nagh-
ten rule. Upon a rehearing en bane, the case
was reversed, but on grounds other than
that of insanity defense.
Two cases from the Ninth Circuit are
18 229 F.2d 602 (5th Cir, 1956).
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quite significant because Durham came di-
rectly into issue on the appeals. In Ander-
sen v. United States,19 the court declared
that being bound by the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court in Davis20
and Fisher,21 it could not follow Durham
and indeed it had:
. .no desire to join the courts of New
Hampshire and the District of Columbia in
their "magnificent isolation" of rebellion
against M'Naghten, even though New
Hampshire has been traveling down that
lonesome road since 1870. See State v. Pike,
49 N.H. 399. Rather than stumble along
with Pike, we prefer to trudge along the
now well-traveled pike blazed more than
a century ago by M'Naghten. 22
In Sauer v. United States, 23 the same
court again rejected Durham, while saying
of M'Naghten: "the right and wrong test
has withstood the onslaught of critics, not
because it is scientifically perfect, but be-
cause the courts regard it as the best
criteria yet articulated for ascertaining
criminal responsibility which comports with
the moral feelings of the community. '24
This argument at first blush seems stuffily
conservative, yet upon afterthought, it
strikes one as really getting to the heart
of the matter - the very same argument
delineated at the outset of this article,
namely, that any test must really do what
it purports to set out to do, test incapacity
for responsible criminal activity, without in
any way jeopardizing the fundamental prin-
ciples of our legal system. This is stated
with no sense of hauteur, but rather, re-
states and recognizes the truth of what
19237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
20 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
21 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
22 Andersen v. United States, supra note 19, at
127.
23 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
24 Id. at 649.
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Professor Jerome Hall of Indiana Univer-
sity Law School observed in this regard:
Yet the M'Naghten Rules can no doubt
be improved, to give more scope to current
interdisciplinary knowledge and to employ
language that will facilitate the use of psy-
chiatric testimony. Any improvement must
be based on a view of human behaviour
that is both psychologically sound and com-
patible with legal principles. The essential
legal premise is that man is, in significant
measure, a rational being; and a psycholog-
ical theory that is not only consistent with
this but independently valid as well, is that
man functions as a unitary being. That is,
reason, will, feeling, and so on coalesce; in
normal persons they are integrated. 25
In 1951 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed a denial of a writ
of habeas corpus for one Smith, convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to
death. 26 The basis of the petitioned writ
was the insanity defense. The court divided
four-three, with Chief Judge John Biggs dis-
senting, joined by Judges Staley and Mc-
Laughlin. The dissent said:
The law when it requires the psychiatrist
to state whether in his opinion the accused
is capable of knowing right from wrong
[Smith was tried under a Pennsylvania
M'Naghten type rule], compels the psy-
chiatrist to test guilt or innocence by a
concept which has almost no recognizable
reality . ..
We can see no reason why the legal test
of irresponsibility for the commission of a
crime should not be based upon the prin-
ciple that if the mental illness of the accused
is the proximate,. or a contributory cause of
the crime, then the accused may not be
found guilty of murder.27
25 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility,
65 YALE L. J. 761, 775 (1956).
26 United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d
540 (3d Cir. 1951).
21 Id. at 568.
There has been no discernable trend
around the country to adopt the Durham
approach.2s In fact, as we have already
seen, in one state the "product" test was
strongly condemned. 29 Nonetheless, at least
three states, Pennsylvania, New York and
Massachusetts, have the problem of a re-
vision of the insanity defense under study.
The Durham Test Considered
The advocates of the Durham approach
often put their critics at serious disadvan-
tage, for in their facile approach to the
difficult and complex subject of responsi-
bility, they make a refutation of Durham
appear platitudinous. This is due to the
fact that those of other opinions take their
stand on the hard facts of social protection
and the maintenance of the hard core of
legal principles, while the defenders of
Durham resort to an individualistic, more
clinical approach with all its personalistic,
emotional overtones. As Dr. John Cava-
nagh, a contributor to this symposium, has
but recently declared: "The recent deci-
sions of the courts seem to overlook
society's needs and show an almost senti-
mental concern for the defendant. Perhaps
what we need is a more rational and less
emotional approach to this problem. '30
In their critiques of M'Naghten, the
proponents of Durham insist that the
former's chief weakness is exclusive reli-
ance upon a single symptom of mental
28 The Durham rule was not considered in United
State v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314
(1954) and in Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115
A.2d 502 (1955) and in Thomas v. State, 206
Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955).
29 Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1957).
30 The Aftermath of the Durham Rule, address
delivered by John R. Cavanagh to the Jacobi Med-
ical Society, Feb. 17, 1958.
disorder,8 1 and that, even with "irresistible
impulse" added to it, the M'Naghten rule
is scarcely more successful for it continues
to remain isolated from the realities of
modern-day psychiatric science. A symp-
tom is a subjective manifestation of disease
not necessarily requiring a conclusion that
the disease in fact exists. It seems irrele-
vant, then, to a responsibility test whether
knowledge be a comprehensively accurate
note from a clinical point of view. For a
jury, for example, to reach a finding of
criminal irresponsibility, justifying a de-
fense of insanity, logically it would seem
warranted in coming to that conclusion if
either or both of these facts were presented:
(1) if the defendant lacked the capacity
to distinguish between right and wrong;
to know the nature and quality of the act
committed, or (2) if he were unable to
restrain himself from legally prohibited con-
duct; to adhere, that is, to the requirements
of law.
To bolster his objection to a knowledge
test, Judge David Bazelon in Durham cites
Dr. Isaac Ray, who in his famous Medical
Jurisprudence of Insanity, had declared:
S. . that the insane mind is not entirely de-
prived of the moral discernment, but in
many subjects is perfectly rational, and
displays the exercise of a sound and well
balanced mind is one of those facts now
so well established, that to question it
would only betray the height of ignorance
and presumption.8 2
However, it is not the knowledge test
aspect of M'Naghten with which Durham is
at odds at all, but rather its stringently legal
approach to the critical problem of deter-
mining insanity on the basis of criteria
81 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
82 RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 32
(1st ed. 1838).
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intelligible to a jury of laymen. The author
of Durham is at pains to make this point
obvious: "The fundamental objection to
the right-wrong test, however, is not that
criminal irresponsibility is made to rest upon
an inadequate, invalid, or indeterminable
symptom or manifestation, but that it is
made to rest upon any particular symp-
tom." 33
Thus, Durham stands committed by such
vagueness of expression to no norm or
criterion whatsoever. What it purports to
effect is, of course, a more humanitarian
approach to the grave problems that under-
lie our entire system of penology, crimi-
nology and law enforcement. It is not too
much, I think, to say as did the Court
in Fisher,3 4 that this is properly the pro-
vince of the legislative branch of govern-
ment, which is that branch in a democracy
most responsive to the popular will and to
"the moral feelings of the community."
From this defective no-norm formula of
Durham springs a cognate difficulty, that
of usage of the unqualified term "product."
Inhering in the very concept of productivity
is that of causality. It is upon this facet
of Durham that the reporter for the Ameri-
can Law Institute expresses dissatisfaction:
The difficulty with this formulation in-
heres in the ambiguity of "product." If
interpreted to lead to irresponsibility un-
less the defendant would have engaged in
criminal conduct even if he had not suf-
fered from the disease or defect, it is too
broad: an answer that he would have done
so can be given very rarely; . . . If inter-
preted to call for a standard of causality
less relaxed than but-for cause, there are
but two alternatives to be considered: (1)
a mode of causality involving total in-
capacity or (2) a mode of causality which
88 Durham v. United States, supra note 31, at 872.
84 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
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involves substantial incapacity. . . . But if
either of these causal concepts is intended,
the formulation ought to set it forth.3 5
With this viewpoint Professor Jerome
Hall is in agreement when he states:
[T]he emphasis of the Durham test is on
the question of causation; and here too the
jury can do no more than speculate ...
The criminal law is concerned with volun-
tary conduct, and the problem of "causa-
tion" is therefore quite different there from
what it is in the realm of mechanics. To
make sense of "causation" in the sphere
of purposive conduct means to take account
of the actor as a rational being. A harm
is imputed to (is caused by) a human actor
because he voluntarily brought it about.
And to say that he voluntarily brought it
about is to say also that cognition was
involved in the conduct. This is how the
problem of causation must be dealt with
in analysis of purposive conduct; this, in-
deed, is the logic of the M'Naghten Rules
and of integrative psychology.8 6
Inevitably such a rule, by bringing to the
fore the testy causality factor, leads to con-
fusion in the legal mind, to chaos in the
lay juror's mind, and grieves both the rigid
traditionalist in these matters and the pro-
gressive who is desirous of serious reform
in this prickly area of the criminal law.
The older test was eminently workable for
a jury, despite the scientific objections. The
knowledge and the later gloss on that rule
by way of the "irresistible impulse" test
threw the question of criminal responsi-
bility into sensible, easily understandable
concepts - did this man, who now profes-
ses insanity at the time of the act, did he
then have those attributes of criminal pur-
posefulness, determination and deliberate-
3 5 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01, comment 159
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
.36 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility,
65 YALE L. J. 761, 779-80 (1956).
ness, such as we identify with the typical
criminal? Of course not. He wasn't even
capable of thinking such a program out or
putting it into effect - he was insane. Note
now, the shift in emphasis on to a more
uncertain, speculative ground. Ultimately
it relegates the fundamental question of
causality back to a nether region as yet a
scientific mystery - what causes insanity?
As an eminent government research psy-
chiatrist recently said to me in this regard,
"Tell me what causes insanity, and what
it is, and perhaps I could say what insanity
does and doesn't cause in human behavior."
As early as the year following Durham,
misgivings about the efficiency of a "prod-
uct" test were being expressed from au-
thorities as expert in this field as Chief
Judge Biggs of the Third Circuit.37 The
Durham court itself, in the insanity cases
since the original ruling, has discovered
itself enmeshed in the entangling web of its
own making. In the Douglas case 38 the
court speaks of the casual relationship be-
tween the mental condition of the defend-
ant and the criminal act in terms of the
tort causality "but" or "except for," a
concept in itself under much and continued
study by the experts within that field of
law. The Douglas case is important in that
it marks a significant development in the
procedural aspects concerning the reading
of the Durham instructions to a jury. This,
in turn, demands that the defense counsel
pitch his insanity defense along one of sev-
eral available lines, under the "knowledge"
rule, "irresistible impulse" or that of the
Durham "product" test. Accordingly, then,
he must request appropriate instructions,
while the trial court itself must step gingerly
87 BIGGS, THE GuiLTY MIND 155 (1955).
38 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
over many pitfalls to prevent reversible
error in the manner in which it expresses
these various alternatives.
In the Carter case 39 while the insanity
issue was at the core of the issues involved,
it was not the basis of the reversal handed
down by the court of appeals. Nonetheless,
Judge Prettyman, speaking for himself and
Judges Burger and Bazelon, devotes eight
of the decision's twenty pages to a discus-
sion of the causation problerh implicit in
the "product" test. The trial judge's expla-
nation of "product" was found both inade-
quate and insufficient. The lower court had
instructed the jury that:
By this term "product" or "causal con-
nection," you are told that the criminal act
must be a consequence, a growth, natural
result or substantive end of a mental ab-
normality or unsoundness in order for the
defendant to avail himself of the defense
of insanity.
The criminal act of the defendant, if you
find he did the act, must have resulted or
been produced by the unsoundness of his
mental condition, not in a minor or nomi-
nal way, but in the sense of being in direct
relation to and the consequence of the
diseased or defective mental condition. 40
Judge Prettyman then explains once and,
apparently for all times, what is meant by
the term "product" in the usage of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
There must be a relationship between the
disease and the act, and that relationship,
whatever it may be in degree, must be, as
we have already said, critical in its effect
in respect to the act. By "critical" we mean
decisive, determinative, causal; we mean to
convey the idea inherent in the phrases
"because of", "except for", "without which",
"but for", "effect of", "result of", "causa-
39 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
40 Id. at 615.
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tive factor"; the disease made the effective
or decisive difference between doing and
not doing the act. The short phrases "prod-
uct of" and "causal connection" are not
intended to be precise, as though they were
chemical formulae .... 41
To a jury the effect of such an explanation
as this is to "justify reasonably the conclu-
sion that 'but for this disease the act would
not have been committed'." How this jury
determination is to be aided by expert testi-
mony in this type of case, is further stated:
[T]he facts must be informed with some
particularity. This must be done by testi-
mony .... Description and explanation of
the origin, development and manifestations
of the alleged disease are the chief func-
tions of the expert witness. . .. The law
wants from the medical experts ... opinion
as to the relationship, if any, between the
disease and the act of which the prisoner
is accused. 42
In this consideration of the use of expert
testimony to enlighten the jury's factual
determination as to the existence of a pos-
sible exculpating mental condition in the
defendant, it is not intended to exclude
pertinent, competent lay testimony as to
these facts.
As said on this point, "Lay witnesses
may testify upon observed symptoms of
mental disease because mental illness is
characterized by departures from normal
conduct. 4
3
More directly akin to the causation prob-
lem is the Wright case44 decided just a week
after Carter. In this case Judge David
Bazelon, author of the Durham rule, speak-
ing for a majority of the court, called for a
41 Id. at 617.
42 Id. at 617-18.
43 Id. at 618.
44 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d. 4 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
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reversal of the trial court on the grounds
that the government in its prosecution of
the case had failed to establish its burden
of proving defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This case best illustrates the fallibility
of the Durham test inasmuch as the expert
testimony of the eleven psychiatrists in the
case was ostensibly at odds. Asked if there
were insanity in the case, Dr. Parretti said
"yes," Dr. Miller said, "Could very well be."
Dr. Richman said Wright was mentally ill
at the time of the shooting. Dr. Gilbert
thought probably he was mentally ill at
the time. Drs. Todd, Cavanaugh and Tarto-
glino could not say; Dr. Epstein and Dr.
Cushard, meanwhile, asked in terms of the
"product" test, testified they had insuffi-
cient data upon which to voice an opinion.
Judge Bazelon contends that there was
no conflict in the medical testimony since
none of the experts stated Wright was not
ill at the time of the alleged crime or that
the act was not the product of mental illness.
In this opinion, the very author of the
Durham test presents a most interesting, if
curious, description of causality in the
criminal insanity situation. This point came
up for court consideration in the case inas-
much as there was to be a retrial of the
case and in the original trial, the judge
there had refused a requested instruction
on the meaning of causality in the "prod-
uct" test.
Judge Bazelon introduces the question
of causality with an odd query:
When we say that one event causes an-
-other, do we mean it is a cause of it, or
the principal cause, or the exclusive cause?
When a jury is told it may convict the
accused if it finds that, though he was men-
'tally ill when he committed the act, the
illness did not cause the act, may it convict
if it finds that the illness was one of the
causes of his act, but not the exclusive
cause? The answers to these questions are
to be found in Carter v. United States, 101
U.S. App. D.C. at page -, and 252 F.2d
at 614 and Douglas v. U. S. (1956) 99
U.S. App. D.C. 232, 239, 239 F.2d 52,
59.45
Because of the lack of the requested instruc-
tions, Judge Bazelon contends that the jury
in the first trial of the case could have
found itself faced with impossibly difficult
skeins of causal relationships to unravel.
I believe that philosophical preoccupa-
tions with concepts such as "principal" and
"exclusive" cause and a confusion on the
facts is inevitable with the "product" test
because of its latent ambiguity on the all-
important causality question.
Because of its inherent ambiguity on the
pivotal point of causation, the Durham rule
may very well inhibit that very freedom of
the psychiatrist to testify which it had
hoped to insure. The report of the Com-
mittee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry takes
serious account of the ethical involvement
in court of the psychiatrist as an expert
witness. In fact its own feelings on this
score seem to be seriously at odds with
Durham. As it declared:
The psychiatrist can meet the require-
ments for the defense if he does so in his
own terms. The central issue of the trial
is the proof that the accused committed
the act charged. The central psychiatric
issue is the actual determination of the men-
tal status of the accused: the joint issue is
the rational disposition of the defendant.
The psychiatrist can answer the condition
- "in consequence of such illness he com-
mitted the act" - not in the sense that men-
tal illness causes the crime, but in the sense
that mental illness vitiates the normal ca-
45 Id. at 12.
pacity for control.46
In accordance with this point of view, the
authors of the G.A.P. report suggest the
following definition of mental illness:
s. I Mental illness shall mean an illness
which so lessens the capacity of a person
to use (maintain) his judgment, discretion
and control in the conduct of his affairs
and social relations as to warrant his com-
mitment to a mental institution.
s. II Where Mental Illness is a Defense:
No person may be convicted of any crimi-
nal charge when at the time he committed
the act with which he is charged, he was
suffering from mental illness as defined by
this Act and in consequence thereof, he
committed the act.47
Other Proposed Tests
In light of my foregoing remarks con-
cerning the Durham rule, do I then suggest
the retention of the M'Naghten rule as such
sine addito? No, I think not. What is wrong
with the M'Naghten rule lies not in its
approach to the problem of legal insanity,
but rather in that it demands too much.
It calls, for all purposes, for total impair-
ment of the cognitive powers, and when
the "irresistible impulse" test is added on
to it, demands complete impairment of the
volitional power as well.
While taking a similarly legal approach
to the problem of criminal responsibility,
the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute calls not for total incapacity, but
justly demands "substantial" impairment.
It states:
s. 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Ex-
cluding Responsibility.
46 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 26, 8 n. 26 (1954).
(Emphasis added.)
47 Id. at 8.
5 CATHOLTC LAWYER, WINTER 1959
(1) A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect"
do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
48
The entire formulation of this code has
the virtue of much laborious study, as well
as the combined efforts of top legal and
scientific talent. It in turn has been sub-
jected to rigid scrutiny and study by vari-
ous individuals and groups since its initial
publication. Not all who have studied it
approve of its insanity test formulation.
As can be seen, it adheres substantially to
traditional lines, sufficiently modified as to
make the test more generally practicable.
Although "productivity" is indeed a feature
of the ALI test, it does not carry with it
the fatal ambiguity of the Durham product
formula, which the Institute studied but
rejected as hopelessly and dangerously
vague. 49
The Judicial Council of Massachusetts
in 1957 made a study of the insanity test
with an eye to a revision of its own stand-
ards. The majority of the study committee
supported the Model Penal Code approach.
One dissent, however, suggested that "the
legal test of insanity [be left] to develop
under our judicial decisions as the local
law of Massachusetts. '5 0
The operative rule on the question of the
48 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §4.0 1, at 27 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
49 Cf. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, comments 159
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
50 Minority Report as to Defense of Irresponsibil-
ity in Criminal Cases, 1957 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
MASS. 64.
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insanity defense in Massachusetts today
states:
One whose mental condition is such that
he cannot distinguish between right and
wrong is not responsible for his conduct,
and neither is one who has the capacity to
discriminate between right and wrong but
whose mind is in such a diseased condition
that his reason, conscience and judgment
are overwhelmed by the disease and render
him incapable of resisting and controlling
an impulse which leads to the commission
of a [crime] .... 51
While this committee gives recognition
to the fact that the knowledge test, with
"irresistible impulse" added to it, "take[s]
due account of the fact that capacity for
knowledge and control are the constituents
of a responsible action and that it is pre-
cisely these capacities that are impaired
when mental disease or defect produces
irresponsibility, ' . 2 nonetheless, the majority
of the committee felt that these older tests
demand too much in the way of totality of
impairment of the mental powers which
"know" and "control" acts. Certainly the
only legitimate object of any reform in the
standards for determining criminal respon-
sibility in this area would be so to broaden
the tests as to allow for more just pleas of
exculpation, when they arise, without at
the same time sacrificing important safe-
guards to public safety and the maintenance
of a firm and responsible system of justice.
Such safeguards, I believe, are found in
the Model Penal Code, when it states that:
"A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
51 Commonwealth v. McCann, 325 Mass. 510, 91
N.E. 2d 214, 217 (1950). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844)..
52 Majority Report as to Defense of Irresponsibil-
ity in Criminal Cases, 1957 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
MASS. 57.
result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of
law." 53
This test, as can easily be seen, retains
the basic norms of the older M'Naghten
rule, and "irresistible impulse," while mak-
ing substantial improvements upon their
mode of expression. The phrase "to appre-
ciate" is a fair and just addition, for it
includes cases of people whose mental con-
dition has caused a deterioration of their
capacity for judgment, i.e., in making a
practical, moral evaluation of a situation
- a more illuminating and meaningful for-
mula than the former "distinguish between
right and wrong" standard.
Furthermore, the Model Penal Code
without demanding total incapacity of the
,mental processes, still calls for a "substan-
tial" impairment.
This test has been attacked by some on
the ground that by its use of the words
"result of" it introduces the most obnoxious
feature of Durham, which the Institute itself
explicitly rejected.5 4 This, of course, is no
real objection at all, because the Model
Penal Code indeed introduces productivity
to its tests, for a notion of productivity
hovers about any insanity test. What makes
it objectionable in Durham is its unlimited,
unqualified usage.
As for the phrase "to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law," undoubt-
edly this quite satisfactorily introduces a
volitional aspect into an insanity rule which
satisfies good morals, good medicine and
good law. It is likewise a more happy and
53 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.01(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
5 4 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, comments 159
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
desirable result than the occasional pres-
ence of that satellite to the knowledge rule,
the "irresistible impulse" test.
It is this particular phrase that especially
annoys Mr. Muldoon, of the minority to
the Massachusetts Judicial Council Report:
I think the law as commonly under-
stood may need clarifying along lines sug-
gested in the majority report as to knowl-
edge and control and the capacity for the
criminal intent. My difficulty [with the "to
conform . . ." phrase] with the words ...
is their vagueness as a guide for a judge in
decision or instructions to a jury. 55
In support of his own reservations on
this matter, Mr. Muldoon notes a like dis-
content on the part of a Canadian Commis-
sion Report of 1957, which said: "We
think the main proposal [§401] has many
features of our law as presently interpreted
and applied, but [it] has the .defect of hav-
ing no jurisprudence to support it and
would be much more difficult to present
to a jury." 56
However, the present test in Canada57
which Mr. Muldoon seems so to admire,
attempts too much in a single statute, and,
therefore, gives the statute in question a
rigidity that would be out of step with
55 Minority Report as to Defense of Irresponsi-
bility in Criminal Cases, 1957 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF MASS. 63.
56 Ibid.
57 The Canadian test reads in part:
(1) ....
(2) For the purposes of this section a person
is insane when he is in a state of natural imbecility
or has disease of the mind to an extent that renders
him incapable of appreciating the nature and
quality of an act or omission or of knowing that
an act or omission is wrong.
(3) A person who has specific delusions, but
is in other respects sane, shall not be acquitted
on the ground of insanity unless the delusions
caused him to believe in the existence of a state
of things, that, if it existed, would have justified
or excused his act or omission .... Ibid.
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future new classifications of species of
mental illness.
Proposals of Study Subcommittee of
Governor Harriman's Conference
on the Defense of Insanity
On May 29, 1958, the Study Subcom-
mittee of the Governor's Conference on the
Defense of [nsanity issued its interim re-
port. For all purposes the test advocated
by the group is that proposed by the Model
Penal Code. In the actual insanity test, this
group inserts "to know" before "to appre-
ciate." The present section 1120 of the New
York State Penal Law covers this point.
Following the M'Naghten rule, it speaks of
knowledge of the "nature and quality" of
theact he was doing or, in the alternative,
no knowledge that the act was wrong. The
Governor's Committee felt that one who is
incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness
of his act is necessarily unable to know and
to appreciate its "nature and quality."
With the drafters of the Model Penal
Code, the Governor's Committee likewise
agreed that "the terms 'mental disease or
defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct."58s The draftsmen
thus excluded positively from the concept
of mental disease or defect, the sociopathic
or so-called psychopathic personality dis-
orders. This medical classification admit-
tedly covers a wide grey area between per-
sons definitely disordered and those more
mildly so. Characteristics of this group
would be the inability to conform to the
usual norms of social conduct. It was felt
that as yet, this area is too undefined by-the
mental sciences as to allow exculpation on
58 Cf. GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY (April 1958). (Emphasis
added.)
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that basis. As they declared themselves on
this important point:
It seems quite clear that M'Naghten can-
not safely be relaxed, as we propose to
recommend, unless a stricter view of men-
tal disease underlies the principle to be
applied. For it is wholly circular in reason-
ing, as many psychiatrists agree, to define
the concept of disease solely by reference
to the phenomena which must be the prod-
uct of disease for irresponsibility to be
established. Thus whether the matter be
viewed in terms of its intrinsic logic or,
even more clearly, in terms of social policy,
the statute must make clear the diagnosis
of psychopathy shall not suffice to lay the
basis for a claim of irresponsibility. In the
present state of knowledge we are satisfied
that there is no escape from treating per-
sons of this order as subject to conviction




A related problem relates to the question
of diminished responsibility. Put succinctly,
the question in practice amounts to this:
Whether mental disease, not amounting
to insanity, can, by affecting the mental
state of accused, reduce the degree of the
crime charged? New York State statutory
law to a slight extent already recognizes
this theory inasmuch as first degree (com-
mon-law) murder carries with it a manda-
tory death sentence,60 while in felony murder
cases and some others, jury discretion is
permitted in recommending life imprison-
ment.61 The sanction for second degree
murder is twenty years to life. New York
case history on this point is interesting. In
the Sindram case,62 decided in 1882, the
59 Id. at 5.
60 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044.
61 N. Y. PENAL LAW §1045.
62 Sindram v. People, 88 N.Y. 196 (1882).
court rejected the diminished responsibility
concept. Here Sindram had shot and killed
the landlady of his boarding house, appar-
ently in retaliation fof receiving notice to
leave the premises on the day previous.
Insanity was not raised as a defense at the
trial. Rather, it was argued by counsel that
the defendant's violent act had been the
result of anger and impulse, so that he
lacked that state of mind, due to eccentrici-
ties, etc., but short of insanity, necessary
to have formed the requisite premeditation
and deliberation for a first degree murder
charge. The court did not agree, stating:
"[T]he theory that eccentricities of char-
acter and inordinate passion can render a
sane man incapable of committing an of-
fense which involves deliberation is wholly
inadmissible." '6 3
In People v. Moran,6 4 however, the
Court of Appeals seems to have taken
another stand on this matter:
Feebleness of mind or will, even though
not so extreme as to justify a finding that
the defendant is irresponsible, may properly
be considered by the triers of the facts in
determining whether a homicide has been
committed with a deliberate and premedi-
tated design to kill, and may thus be effec-
tive to reduce the grade of the offense. 65
It appears that within the limits here
indicated, the doctrine of diminished re-
sponsibility is recognized by nine states,
and is probably so in another five; it has
been rejected by six states, and is probably
so in five others. 6
Section 4.02 (2) of the Model Penal
Code, in view of the above division of
legal opinion, suggests this:
63 id. at 202.
64 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).
65 Id. at 180, 163 N.E. at 553.
66 Cf. Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 883
n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
(1) Evidence that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect shall be
admissable whenever it is relevant to prove
that the defendant did or did not have a
state of mind which is an element of the
offense.
(2) Whenever the jury or the Court is
authorized to determine or recommend
whether or not the defendant shall be sen-
tenced to death or to life imprisonment
upon conviction, evidence that the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law was
impaired as a result of mental disease or
defect shall be admissable in favor of sen-
tence of life imprisonment. 67
Both the Davis Bill, recently introduced
into Congress to modify the existing law
on criminal responsibility for the District
of Columbia, and the interim report of the
Governor's subcommittee studying this
same problem in New York State have en-
dorsed paragraph one of section 4.02 of
the Code, but neither felt it politic to em-
brace the more controversial second para-
graph. On this point, the Governor of New
York's subcommittee had this to say of
paragraph one:
The reason for the proposal is that some
courts in the United States decline for rea-
sons of policy to accord to evidence of
mental disease or defect an admissability
co-extensive with its relevancy to prove or
disprove a material state of mind. In the
District of Columbia, for example, evidence
of mental disease is not admissable in a
first degree murder case to prove that the
defendant was incapable of the deliberation
necessary for conviction, a result sustained
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
See Fisher v. U. S., 328 U.S. 463. There is
an intimation in People v. Moran, 249 N. Y.
179, that the law of New York is otherwise,
6 7 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.02, at 28 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
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that in determining whether a defendant
could deliberate, mental disorder, whatever
its degree, is a feature of the evidence to be
considered. This is so plainly right, in our
view, in point of policy, that any doubt
upon the issue ought to be dispelled by a
revision of the statutes on this subject. 68
In the District of Columbia a graphic
illustration of this problem at the present
time is Willie Lee Stewart. He had twice
been tried and convicted on the identical
charge of first degree murder. Both times
his appeals to the Court of Appeals, D. C.
Circuit, had been successful. Likewise, in
both trials, Stewart's defense was that of
insanity. In the first appeal Stewart success-
fully argued reversible error on the basis
of an erroneous instruction to the jury.
What makes this first appeal (pre-Durham)
of particular interest is its strong reliance
upon the diminished responsibility theory
- a position especially taken by the amicus
curiae brief in the case. Clearly, Mr.
Chayes, author of this brief, illustrates how
the contemporary pressures for reform of
the "insanity tests" are intimately tied with
more basic questions of criminal law, crimi-
nology and law enforcement themselves.
Of course, to broaden the approach for the
less-than-insanity type cases is, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, directly to challenge the
holdings in Fisher v. United States.69
The offense charged in Stewart was homi-
cide committed in the course of a robbery,
hence premeditation and deliberation to
kill needed no proof to establish the offense
of first degree murder. The question raised
by Stewart's counsel was whether Stewart
had or could have had the necessary mens
rea to commit the underlying felony. Re-
68 GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DE-
FENSE OF INSANITY 5 (April 1958).
69 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
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versal of the case was forthcoming, but,
as we said, on other grounds. The court
refused to accept the position of the amicus
in the case, declaring:
Despite the force of the considerations
presented so persuasively by the amicus,
we have concluded that reconsideration of
our decision in Fisher should wait until we
can appraise the results of the broadened
test of criminal responsibility which we re-
cently anounced in Durham. Only upon
such an appraisal will it be possible to deter-
mine whether need for the rule remains. 70
The retrial of Stewart for the third time on
the original charge is expected shortly. 71
Actually the area within which propo-
nents of diminished responsibility argue for
reform is very narrow. In this restricted
aspect of the problem, there is, I think,
much merit in their position. Legal demar-
cations are at best obscure, if not impos-
sible to determine at all. Psychiatry itself,
as on the question of sociopathology, and
here, must be on much more sure ground
before its testimony can be adopted as a
trusted and useful ally. As the report of
the Group for the Advancement of Psychia-
try itself declared anent this point:
Certainly in keeping with our concepts of
mental life and behavior there can be little
question of differences of responsibility for
given acts, but we have not as yet devised
a formula for measuring them. Conse-
quently, in workaday practice we perforce
cling to the expedient of "common sense"
in estimating diminished responsibility in all
cases. Here the psychiatrist may do some-
what better than the man on the street, but
70 Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 883
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
71 For an informative analysis of the arguments
for and against the concept of partial or dimin-
ished responsibility readers are referred to Fox v.
State, 316 P.2d 924 (Nev. 1957).
not much.72
Conclusion
Criminality and mental illness have been
said to be but two faces of the same coin.73
Such is not the case at all. As we have tried
to show this viewpoint is neither "good
morals, nor good science nor good law."
It is this fallacious evaluation of what man
is, on part of many psychiatrists, lawyers
and writers on the subject of criminal
irresponsibility that has given rise to sus-
picions as to the real motivation behind
reform in this area. As one recent writer
put it:
But there is an opposite extreme which is
still more dangerous because it promotes
a conception of human nature which is
basically false. This is the viewpoint that
undermines all human responsibility by re-
ducing man to a mechanism or making his
conduct the mere product of his instinct or
of his unconscious drives. . . . There is
such a thing as freedom. There is such a
thing as normality. Men do deliberately
choose what is wrong and what is criminal. 74
Characteristic of this erroneous viewpoint
are statements that appear at times even
in judicial decisions, such as:
[The law] assumes that there is a faculty
called reason which is separate from instinct,
emotion and impulse, that enables an indi-
vidual to distinguish between right and
wrong and endows him with moral respon-
sibility for his acts ...
• . . The modern science of psychology
• . . does not conceive that there is a sep-
72 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 26, 6 n. 21 (1954).
73 Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness -Two
Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 320
(1955).
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arate little man at the top of one's head
called reason whose function it is to guide
another wrong little man called instinct,
emotion, or impulse in the way he should
go .... 75
Certainly this entire question of insanity
and the law is a much broader one than
simply the fashioning of new legal rules on
the part of the experts. Since this latter
phase of the question covers but one area
of the larger one of responsibility before
the law in general, it takes on aspects that
are simultaneously medical, ethical, legal
and sociological. It should be remembered
that the Royal Commission Report on
Capital Punishment, with the healthy real-
ism that the law usually reflects, recognized
too, the many-faceted features of this
question:
A just and adequate doctrine of criminal
responsibility cannot be founded on legal
principles alone. Responsibility is a moral
question, and there is no issue on which it is
more important that the criminal law should
be in close accord with the moral standards
of the community. There can be no pre-
75 Hollaway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-
67 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See also Hill, The Psycho-
logical Legalism of Thurman Arnold, 22 U. CHi.
L. REV. 377 (1955).
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established harmony between the criteria
of moral and criminal responsibility, but
they ought to be made to approximate as
nearly as possible. The views of ordinary
men and women about the moral accounta-
bility of the insane has been gradually modi-
fied by the development of modern science,
and if the law cannot be said to have kept
pace with them, it has followed them at a
distance and has slowly adjusted itself to
their changes ...
In our view the question of responsibility
is not primarily a question of medicine, any
more than it is a question of law. It is essen-
tially a moral question with which the law
is intimately concerned and to which solu-
tion medicine can bring notable aid, and it
is one which is most appropriately decided
by a jury of ordinary men and women, not
by medical or legal experts. 76
This is, I believe, a fair and judicious
evaluation of this entire issue. As such, it
appears more in keeping with our demo-
cratic society that admittedly needed re-
forms in the field of criminal responsibility
should be effected by the people themselves
through the intelligently informed legisla-
tive process, rather than by the legitimate
exercise of judicial authority.
76Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-53, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932 at 79 (1953).
